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Pereira v. Sessions and the Future of Deportation Proceedings
By Louisa Edzie1
Article 1 section 8 of the United States Constitution give
the U.S. government enumerated powers to establish a uniform
rule on Naturalization. To carry out these duties, 8 U.S. Code
§ 1227 gives the government the power to initiate removal
proceedings against noncitizens who are undocumented or may
have lost their status in the U.S. However, before removal
proceedings commence, the government per 8 U.S. Code § 1229
has to send a Notice to Appear (NTA) to the non-citizen.2 An NTA
is a written notice given to the noncitizen about the nature of
proceedings against the noncitizen, the legal authority under which
the proceedings are conducted, the acts or conduct alleged to be in
violation of law, the charges against the noncitizen and the
statutory provisions alleged to have been violated, etc.3 Hence the
query of whether non-citizens in deportation proceedings have due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment has been fairly
established by the courts.4 This provides non-citizens in US
immigration courts the assurance that the government would
follow due process of the law in its adjudication of removal
proceedings. Under the current Trump administration, there has
been more efforts by the government to undermine Due Process
protections of non-citizens in the adjudication of removal
proceedings through unfounded interpretations of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, grants
the Attorney General of the United States the discretion to “cancel
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removal” and adjust the status of certain nonpermanent residents.5
Specifically, the statute provides a stop-time rule wherein a noncitizen who has overstayed their visa, and is subject to removal
proceedings, may be eligible for cancellation of removal
proceedings if he/she has been physically present and has lived
continuously in the U.S. for over 10 years preceding the
application of cancellation of removal.6 For a while, the courts did
not have a consensus on whether a putative NTA that fails to list
the place and time for a removal proceeding stopped time in favor
of the government for the purposes of cancellation of removal.
However, in Pereira v. Sessions, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the stop-time rule is triggered when
the government serves a non-citizen a NTA that is defective.7 First,
the Court referred to section 1229(a) of Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) to address the question of what a written
notice must state. Section 1229(a) of INA provides that a written
NTA should specify the nature of the proceedings, the legal
authority under which the proceedings are conducted, and the acts
or conduct alleged to be in violation of law among other things.
Importantly, §1229(a)(1)(G)(i) states that the NTA must specify
the time and date at which the removal proceedings must be held.8
The Court ruled that a putative NTA that fails to designate
the specific time or place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings is
not an NTA under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1229(a) and hence does not trigger
the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C.S § 1229(d)(1)(A) for
determining eligibility for cancellation of removal.9 The Court
stated that throughout the statutory section, it is clear that an NTA
is a written notice specifying the time and place at which the
5
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removal proceedings will be held.10 Therefore according to the
Court, the intent of Congress as it relates to a putative NTA
specifying the time and place for removal proceedings was plain
and specific. In addition, the Court ruled that common sense leads
to the conclusion that when it comes to serving NTAs to
noncitizens, there is a procedure. If that procedure is not followed,
then the government cannot subject the non-citizen to the
consequences of failing to appear to his or her removal
proceedings because a notice that does not inform a noncitizen
when and where to appear for removal proceedings is not a notice
to appear.11
If it is not obvious why the law regarding why Procedural
Due Process for a putative NTA has to be followed, the standard
consequence for a non-citizen’s failure to appear is severe should
suffice. Per law, if a non-citizen who has been properly served
with the written notice required under section (2) of [8 U.S.C.S.]
§1229(a)” fails to appear at a removal proceedings “he shall be
ordered to remove in absentia”.12 But for a non-citizen to be
ordered removed in absentia, “the Government must ‘establish[] by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the written notice
was so provided and that the alien is removable.’”13 This means
that the burden is on the government to show that it followed due
process in submitting the NTA but the respondent did not show.
And this burden must not be causally overlooked.
In Pereira, the Department of Homeland Security listed
several concerns about the consequences of sticking to the
statutory text of the statute and following the interpretation of the
Court. The government tried to show the court why it must defer to
its interpretation of the statute. The government posited that the
stop-time rule makes broad references to a notice to appear under
10
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“section 1229(a),” which includes paragraph (1), as well as
paragraphs (2) and (3). The fact that the notice to appear sections
of the statute appeared under these many sections made its
meaning as it relates to the stop-time rule of the statute ambiguous.
Firstly, “the Government [argued] that §1229(a) of INA is
not worded in the form of a definition and thus cannot
circumscribe what type of notice counts as a ‘notice to appear’ for
purposes of the stop-time rule.”14 On this issue, the Court ruled
that according to §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), notice to appear is defined as a
“written notice” that “specif[ies],” the time and place of the
removal proceedings at a minimum.15 The Court further added that
the government’s failing to specify integral information, like the
time and place of removal proceedings, unquestionably
would “deprive [the notice to appear] of its essential character.”16
As the Court finds, applying common sense to the situation would
inescapably lead one to the conclusion that a notice to appear
losses it function without a specified time and place. In addition,
without the time and date specified, the respondent is not informed
of where and when to appear. A proceeding cannot proceed
without a specific place date and time.
Secondly, the Government contended that Congress’ use of
the word “under” in the stop-time rule renders the statute
ambiguous.17 The stop-time rule provides that “‘any period of . . .
continuous physical presence’ is ‘deemed to end . . . when the
[non-citizen] is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 18
The government alluded that, the statute is not explicit as to what
“under” means in the statute. The Majority Opinion and the
Dissent both focused on the technicality of the wording in the
statute and contended whether the word “under” in the stop-time
rule provision meant “subject to,” “governed by,” or “issued under
14
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the authority of.”19 The Dissent went on to add that “under” can
also mean “authorized by.20” And if “under” means “authorized by
or subject to or governed by,” then the government would be doing
its job and following procedures by sending NTAs without listing
the particular time and place for the removal hearing.21 According
to the Majority, this view supports the Board of Immigration’s
(BIA) view that “the stop-time rule applies so long as DHS serves
a notice that is ‘authorized by,’ or ‘subject to or governed by, or
issued under the authority of” §1229(a), even if the notice bears
none of the time-and-place information required by that
provision.”22 On this issue, the Court responded by quoting
Kucana v. Holder.23 The Court calls the word ‘under’ a
“chameleon,” in that it “must draw its meaning from its context.”24
And that based on the Court’s reading of the statute, “under” can
only be interpreted as meaning “‘in accordance with or according
to,” for it connects the stop-time trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a
“notice to appear” that contains the enumerated time-and-place
information described in §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).”25 Adhering to the
Court’s interpretation, the stop-time rule applies only if the
government serves an NTA “[i]n accordance with” or “according
to” the substantive time-and-place requirements set forth in
§1229(a).26
Thirdly, the government resorted to more technical
arguments contending that the surrounding statutory provisions
involving “in absentia removal orders” of U.S.C.A 8 § 1229(a) and
19
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§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) reinforced its statutory interpretation.27 The
government cited an example of two separate provisions relating to
in
absentia
removal
orders:
§1229a(b)(5)(A)
and
§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). §1229a(b)(5)(A) provides that a noncitizen
may be removed in absentia if the Government has provided
“written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section
1229(a)”.28 And §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) provides that, once an in
absentia removal order has been entered, the noncitizen may seek
to reopen the proceeding if, inter alia, he “demonstrates that [he]
did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 1229(a).”29 The Court ruled that the logic of the
government statutory provisions surrounding in absentia removal
orders is unsound.30 To that end, the Court stated that the
government essentially argues that phrase 1 and phrase 2 can refer
to the same type of notice even though they use entirely different
words, but that phrase 3 cannot refer to that same type of notice
because it uses words different from phrases 1 and 2.31 However,
according to the Court, the government offers no compelling
evidence as to why that is and so the Court can only provide a
simpler explanation that comports with statutory language and
context, such that each of these three phrases refers to notice
satisfy at a minimum the time and place criteria defined in
§1229(a)(1).32
The Court did not accept the government’s own
interpretation of the statute and its contentions based on
technicalities and practicalities. The government then resorted to
the administrative disposition of immigration law as a basis for
why the incomplete NTA must trigger the stop-time rule. It argued
that the administrative realities of removal proceedings make it
27
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difficult to guarantee that each non-citizen a specific time, date,
and place for his or [her] removal proceedings.33 However, this
practical concern was misplaced according to the Court. The Court
rejected the Dissent’s concern that by requiring the government to
be specific about the time, date, and place for removal proceedings
of non-citizens on their NTA, it might encourage the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide “arbitrary dates and times
that are likely to confuse all who receive them.”34 The Court when
stated that the Dissent’s reasoning makes it appear that the
government “is utterly incapable of specifying an accurate date and
time on a notice to appear and will instead engage in ‘arbitrary’
behavior.”35 Moreover, the government of the United States is not
incapable of following due process by sending court dates and
notices to appear to its respondents.
Now at this point, it appears that Pereira was a case about a
statutory technicality. The government relied on mechanics of the
statute which led to their unfounded and misplaced interpretation
of the stop-time rule provision of the IIRIRA. However, the
language in the statute §1229b (b)(1)(A) is clear. Under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
the Attorney General has discretion to cancel the removal of (1)
Certain non-citizens who have continuously lived in the United
States for not less 10 years immediately preceding the date of the
deportation can apply for cancellation of removal; and (2) the
cancellation of removal is halted when the government sends an
NTA to the non-citizen.36 However, the NTA must follow the
procedures listed in the statute or it fails to be a valid NTA that
halts the stop time rule. Even though Pereira’s impact seems little,
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many deportations orders are tossed because they did not follow
the correct procedures.37
Moreover, Pereira was not just a case about the stop-time
rule and whether the stop-time rule is triggered when a putative
NTA fails in cancellation of removal. Pereira also shed light on
the current interpretation of the Chevron doctrine by the Court.
Chevron deference is a judicial administrative action that came out
of the U.S. Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.38 In Chevron, the Supreme Court
set forth a legal test that governs when the court should defer to the
agency’s answer or interpretation holding that such judicial
deference is appropriate where the agency’s answer was not
unreasonable so long as Congress had not spoken directly to the
precise issue at question.39
In Pereira, Justice Kennedy spoke on the application of
Chevron deference in his concurring opinion, where he noted some
of the Courts of Appeal hastily yielded to the statutory
interpretation of the government’s agency when they should not
have. Yet according to the dissent by Justice Alito, the Court is
supposed to defer to the interpretation of the government’s agency
when it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute under the
Chevron doctrine. Additionally, the government’s agency
interpretation need not be “the only possible interpretation, nor
even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts.”40
Justice Kennedy retorted, saying that simply yielding to the
37
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interpretation of the government when the statute is ambiguous is
yielding the Judiciary’s role in interpreting federal statutes.
According to Justice Kennedy, the Court itself has acknowledged
that “[it]does not leave it to the [government] agency to decide
when it is charge.”41The Court stated that the BIA interpretation of
section 1229(b)(d)(1) in Matter of Camarillo was wrong and
unfounded.42 The Court in Pereira rejected the BIA’s
interpretation that the meaning of 8 U.S.C §1229(b)(d)(1) is
ambiguous. It added that the BIA’s reasoning had little support in
the statute’s text.43 The majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion made it clear that due to the grave consequence
of a respondent’s failure to appear and the complex nature of
immigration law, the ordinary statutory interpretation according
the Chevron deference doctrine should only apply in the
appropriate case. The Court posited that the situation in Pereira
did not warrant a Chevron doctrine application and doing that
absent an ambiguous statutory meaning would exhibit a reflexive
deference.44
The Future of Deportation Proceedings after Pereira
In light of this opinion, it is unclear whether Pereira should
apply retroactively. As previously mentioned, some legal
advocates interpreted Pereira to have a broad impact on the future
of deportation hearings. To some legal advocates, Pereira means
that legal advocates can work to possibly terminate removal cases
based on defective NTAs.45 Hence, any respondent who may be in
41
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removal proceedings served with a defective NTA and removed in
absentia may possibly bring a motion to dismiss or reopen their
case based on the failure of the government to list the time, date,
and/or place for the proceeding and based on no notice pursuant to
INA §§ 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) or 242B(c)(3)(B).46 In a report by Reuters,
obtained through the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) in the wake of Pereira, there were about 9,000 cases that
were dismissed.47 According to the Catholic Legal Immigration
Network (CLINIC), the broad language of Pereira might mean that
failure of respondents to appear in court would be through no fault
of the respondent if the NTA failed to specify the time, place and
date for the proceeding. This is because § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the
INA provides that an in-absentia deportation order may be
rescinded upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien
demonstrates that he did not receive notice in accordance with
paragraph (1) or (2) of INA § 239(a), and the failure to appear was
through no fault of his own.48
On the other hand, if Pereira is not interpreted narrowly
then respondents cannot bring suits to dismiss their deportation
proceedings on grounds of a defective NTA. The U.S Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court in Andia v. Ashcroft held that
due process jurisprudence indicates that a respondent’s rights
under the Fifth Amendment are violated if the respondent did not
receive an actual or constructive notice of the proceedings.49

https://cliniclegal.org/resources/supreme-court-rules-stop-timerule-cancellation-removal.
46
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Furthermore, in Andia v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit
Appeals court—citing Farhoud v. INS—stated that immigrants
who are in deportation proceedings are afforded due process for a
full and fair hearing under the Fifth Amendment.50 Pereira is an
unusual case which shows that it can be unclear when the Chevron
Doctrine is to be followed. The separation of powers as it relates to
the administrative nature of the immigration law is murky in
practice though feasible in theory. As Justice Kennedy stated in his
concurring opinion in Pereira, the courts hastily subscribed to the
interpretation of the BIA when it was considered “reasonable” to
the BIA. The Dissent in Pereira raised an issue, inferring that the
majority opinion was requiring the government to put arbitrary
time, place and date requirements to subsequent NTAs after the
Pereira ruling or risk being defective.51 However, as the Majority
contends, these assumptions are unfounded because “a scheduling
system previously enabled DHS and the immigration courts to
coordinate in setting hearing dates in some cases.”52 The Court
further added, “[g]iven today’s advanced software capabilities, it is
hard to imagine why DHS and immigration courts could not again
work together to schedule hearings before sending notices to
appear.”53
It seems that the government would rather come up with
excuses and unfounded logical reasoning that bears no semblance
to Congress’s intentions as the statutes applies than a uniformed
interpretation of what the law is and should be. The consequences
of failing to appear, be it expedited removal or removal in absentia,
should only proceed when due process has served its full course. In
a completely unrelated case, Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme
50

Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The Due
Process Clause protects aliens in deportation proceedings and
includes the right to a full and fair hearing as well as notice of that
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51
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Court of the United States stated that “[a]s a matter of federal law,
deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”54 Deportation is
an expensive penalty to non-citizen defendants. Though the Court
in Padilla was referring to a criminal defendant, the rationale can
also be applied in the deportation court proceedings before
Immigration Judges.
Although Pereira did not receive as much attention from
the media as other high profile immigration cases like Matter of AB-, it made it possible for respondents with illegal re-entry cases to
request a dismissal of their deportation orders. Matter of A-B was a
case where in an unprecedented chain of events, former Attorney
General Jeff Sessions certified an unpublished BIA case to himself.
The case received so much media coverage because it overruled the
Matter of A-R-C-G- landmark decision by the BIA, which had
recognized that domestic violence survivors may be eligible for
asylum protection.55 Nonetheless, there are dueling interpretations
in the courts about Pereira. Some courts readily accepted and
applied the Pereira decision while some courts have distinguished
Pereira and noted its narrow application. One of the cases that
depicts the narrow interpretation of Pereira is United States v.
Flores-Mora.56 Flores-Mora was a Mexican citizen who first
entered the U.S in 1995 without inspection and was served an NTA
for removal proceedings in September 2009. The NTA listed the
date and time of Flores-Mora’s deportation proceeding as “to be

54
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set.” 57 Flores-Mora signed the NTA, thereby acknowledging his
understanding of the NTA. Flores-Mora was released on his own
recognizance [without being detained] 58 On February 4, 2010, he
was served with a hearing notice, which set the time and date for
his removal hearing for June 24 2010 at 9:00am. Flores-Mora
appeared at the hearing. After the February hearing, there were
four subsequent hearings that Flores-Mora was supposed to appear.
He received notices of four subsequent removal hearings and
appeared to 3 of these hearings. He failed to appear a hearing
scheduled on May 19 and 20, for medical reasons though his
counsel attended that hearing.59 A subsequent hearing followed
and was scheduled for June 4, 2010 at 9:00 am.60. The immigration
court ordered Flores-Mora removed in absentia but Flores-Mora
never moved to appeal this decision61 On February 19, 2013, ICE
arrested Flores-Mora in Manchester, New Hampshire and deported
him to Mexico. Flores-Mora returned to the U.S. at some point
thereafter and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
arrested him in Manchester, [New Hampshire] on August 28, 2018,
leading to his present indictment for illegal reentry.62 Flores-Mora
invoked the Pereira ruling and argued that the immigration court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue his removal order
because the initial NTA failed to designate a specific time or place
for his appearance as required by the 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).63
Flores-Mora argued the NTA the government sent him was not a
"Notice to Appear" for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13” 64 Hence
he argued that NTA could not “constitute a charging document
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a), because it did not indicate the time
57
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and date of the hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) under
the interpretation in Pereira.”65
In United States v. Flores-Mora the United States District
Court for New Hampshire distinguished this case from Pereira.
The court noted that a few other jurisdictions have adopted the
Pereira interpretation and have granted motions to dismiss on this
basis, but the court sided with majority of the courts who have
rejected Pereira’s interpretation. The court ruled that unlike
Pereira, the defendant Flores-Mora did receive notice of the time
and date of his hearing and appeared.”66 In addition, on the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, the United States District Court of New
Hampshire stated that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Pereira
did not strip the immigration courts of its jurisdiction. The court
stated that question at issue in Pereira was narrow and addressed
the specific question of whether a notice to appear that “fails to
specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings . . .
trigger[s] the stop-time rule.”67 The United States District Court of
New Hampshire, Flores-Mora’s situation was different from the
respondent in Pereira. The court also pointed out a narrow
difference between the stop-time rule and jurisdiction cases. It
stated that unlike the stop-time rule, neither the jurisdiction-vesting
provision of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) nor the definition of charging
document under § 1003.13 expressly requires that a notice to
appear contain the information set forth in § 1229(a). Nor do they
cross-reference § 1229(a) when defining the notice to appear, as
the stop-time rule does.”68. Furthermore, the court argued that the
initial NTA was defective and ran afoul of § 1229(a). The
subsequent NTA that listed the date and time cured any defect that
the initial NTA might have had. The court used an analogy of a
how “federal district court may lack subject-matter jurisdiction
65
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 where the complaint filed in a federal
district court for diversity purposes that fails to state in its
complaint the citizenship of the parties or an amount in
controversy over § 75,000.”69 In such a situation, a federal district
court would normally lack jurisdiction because the complaint fails
to seek an amount in controversy that exceeds over $75,000.
However, according to the court, that jurisdiction can be restored if
the complaint is corrected or amended.70
In light of Pereira, not only are legal advocates
representing immigrants bringing requests to dismiss deportation
orders because of defective NTAs, lawyers are also raising issues
about the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently,
respondents are bringing suits for immigration courts to dismiss
deportation orders served to them because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear their case. According to 8 CFR § 1003.14,
“[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge
commence, when a charging document is filed with the
Immigration Court by the Service. The charging document must
include a certificate showing service on the opposing party
pursuant to § 1003.32 which indicates the Immigration Court in
which the charging document is filed.”71
Similar to Flores-Mora is United States v. Perez-Felex72. In that
case, Perez-Felex entered the country without inspection. After
being apprehended, an immigration judge granted Perez-Felex’s
request to voluntarily depart from the United States. Perez-Felex
departed the country and entered again without inspection in 2010.
In an unrelated charge:

69
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70
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Puerto Rico law enforcement officers arrested Pérez
for purported violations of the Domestic Violence
Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 8, sections 601-604, for
possession of a firearm, for possession and use of an
edged weapon, and for aggravated damages.
(Docket No. 35 at p. 2.) The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico Superior Court ultimately dismissed the
criminal
complaint.
Immigration
Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") officers, then, placed Pérez in
federal custody.73
One of the arguments that Perez-Felex relied on to move
his dismissal of deportation case was that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling in Pereira invalidated the 2010 deportation order
against him. The court ruled that Perez-Felex’s reliance on Pereira
was misplaced. The court further added that Pereira is not
dispositive in the sense that the narrow issue the Court ruled on
Pereira was about the stop-time rule and whether or not it was
triggered if the NTA served did not list the time, place and state for
the deportation hearing. Therefore, extrapolating the decision in
Pereira and applying it to Perez-Felex’s case would be unfounded
due to Pereira’s limited and narrow holding. The court further
added that Perez adopted a broad interpretation of Pereira by
asserting that the “immigration judge lacked jurisdiction over him
because the NTA was deficient.”74 A deficient NTA does not out
rightly strip the immigration courts of their jurisdiction.
After it became apparent that the BIA no longer holds
precedent authority over NTAs as it applies to the stop-time rule
for cancellation of removal, the BIA issued a decision that aimed
to push back the Pereira decision in Matter of Bermudez-Costa.75
73
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In that case, Bermudez-Costa, a Mexican citizen entered the
United States without inspection on or about April 30, 1991.76
Bermudez-Costa was personally served an NTA on August 28,
2013 which ordered him “to appear before an immigration judge of
the United States Department of Justice . . . on a date to be set at a
time to be set.”77 On September 9, 2013, the Immigration Court in
Tucson, Arizona mailed a subsequent NTA to his address. The
NTA stated that Bermuda-Costa’s hearing was scheduled to take
place on May 13, 2014, at 1:00 p.m. at 300 West Congress Street,
Suite 300, Tucson, Arizona, 85701. Bermuda-Costa appeared at
this hearing as well as numerous subsequent hearings. At
Bermuda-Costa’s last hearing, he asked for a “continuance or
administrative closure based on his potential eligibility for
adjustment of status.”78
The Immigration Judge denied his request and granted him
voluntary departure. Bermuda-Costa then filed a motion to
terminate while his appeal was pending.79 Bermuda-Costa relied
on the Pereira decision and argued that his case should be
terminated in light of the Pereira decision because, like the
respondent in Pereira, the initial NTA served to him was defective
“under section 239(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.”80 The BIA held that Pereira involved a different set of facts.
It added further that unlike the respondent in Pereira, the
respondent in Bermuda-Costa was properly served with both a
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notice to appear and a subsequent notice of hearing.81 The notice of
hearing specified the time and place of Bermuda-Costa’s hearing
and there is proof that the respondent got the notices because he
attended the subsequent hearings. On the issue of serving a valid
NTA, the BIA held that it had sufficiently specified the time and
place of the hearing in this case and thus had fulfilled the
requirements of a valid NTA. One could argue that an NTA is
different from notice of hearing, at least for the purposes of the
stop-time rule. This is because a notice to appear stops time from
accumulating so if qualified, the Attorney General may cancel the
respondent’s removal. But a notice of hearing just informs the
respondent that there is a hearing. However, the BIA emphasized
the narrow and dispositive question that was at issue in Pereira. To
that end the BIA stated that:
[t]he Court specifically stated multiple times that
the issue before it was “narrow” and that the
“dispositive question” was whether a notice to
appear that does not specify the time and place at
which proceedings will be held, as required by
section 239(a)(1)(G)(i), triggers the “stop-time” rule
for purposes of cancellation of removal. 82
When one analyzes the BIA’s arguments presented in
Matter of Bermuda-Costa, the BIA seems to think that there is no
room for any a broad application of the Pereira decision that
would dismiss an entire removal case because the court remanded
Pereira and specifically did not invalidate the removal proceedings
of the respondent in Pereira. First, the BIA stated that the Court [in
Pereira] specifically stated multiple times that the issue before it
was ‘narrow’ and that the ‘dispositive question’ was whether a
notice to appear that does not specify the time and place of
proceedings will be held, as required by section 239(a)(1)(G)(i),
triggers the stop-time rule for purposes of cancellation of removal.
81
82
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83

The BIA sidelined the decision in Pereira and resorted to the
authority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the court that decided Matter of Bermuda-Costa.
Unsurprisingly, the Ninth Circuit rejected arguments similar to that
of the respondent Bermudez-Costa. The court rejected arguments
that purport to dismiss in-absentia removal cases because of a
defective initial NTAs.84
Popa v. Holder is another case the BIA cited to support its
rejection of the decision in Pereira. In Popa v. Holder, the court
ruled that it comes following the procedure for a putative NTA,
“[a]lthough [section 239] (a)(1)(G)(i) requires a notice to appear to
specify the time and place at which the proceedings will be held,
th[e]court has never held that the [NTA] cannot state that the time
and place of the proceedings will be set at a future time by the
Immigration Court.”85
Since the BIA challenged the Supreme Court on their
interpretation of the requirements of an NTA after its precedent
decision in Matter of Bermudez-Costa, it is unclear what the future
holds as far procedural due process for deportation hearings are
concerned. Currently, there are two dueling interpretations of
whether an NTA that does not list the time place and date is
valid—the Supreme Court Pereira decision and the BIA precedent
decision in Matter of Bermudez-Costa. Although the Executive
branch of government is charged with implementing immigration
laws, the United States Supreme Court is the highest court and its
decisions are supposed to supersede that of the lower courts and
administrative agencies. Granted the BIA is the highest
administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration
laws, the BIA’s decisions are binding on all DHS officers and
Immigration Judges unless modified or overruled by the Attorney
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General or a Federal court.”86According to USCIS the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions are binding on all lower courts and
administrative adjudicators throughout the country.87 It follows
then that even with a precedent decision by BIA, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling Pereira should be the binding decision. The BIA’s
might be persuasive decision but it should not be binding.
Numerous issues follow, such as if the initial NTA served
by the DHS to the noncitizen have to follow the procedure for
putative NTA verbatim as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in
Pereira or does a subsequent NTA correct the mistakes of the
initial NTA for purposes of appearing in court as the BIA has held?
To which type of removal proceedings do these decisions apply? Is
it first time respondent’s removal proceedings or respondents who
have made a second attempt in entering, aka illegal reentry? that
arose in light of the dueling decisions by the US Supreme Court
and the BIA in Pereira and Matter of Bermudez-Costa respectively
should now have firm answers.
Even if some immigration judges decide to follow BIA
decision, Matter of Bermudez-Costa should not overrule Pereira,
but only narrow its the application of NTA as it relates to stop-time
rule for cancellation of removal purposes. This is because the issue
in Pereira had to do with the stop-time rule as it applies to
cancellation of removal where the respondent did not receive the
NTA before his removal proceedings. Where the facts are similarly
situated like Bermudez-Costa, it would not be surprising for
immigration judges to follow the decision by the BIA BermudezCosta. However, it should be noted that the court remanded
86
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Pereira back to the lower courts after determining that the initial
NTA sent to the respondent in Pereira was not an NTA under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court did not address the
lingering question of whether an invalid NTA will give rise to an
automatic cancellation of a deportation order. Furthermore, a
practice advisory by CLINIC notes that Bermudez-Costa did not
address motions to reopen [removal cases] and therefore does not
foreclose reopening based on a defective NTA, so it encourages
practitioners to continues to raise arguments that highlights the
narrow difference between Pereira and Bermudez-Costa.88
Even though Immigration law is complex with its
particularities, such as Chevron deference, the Supreme Court
insisted that this is not the type of case that requires Chevron
deference. With regards to the future of Deportation Proceedings,
it is clear from the Pereira decision that at least in cases where a
putative NTA in removal proceedings fails to list the time or place
of the initial hearing, the NTA will not interrupt the mandatory
period of 10 years continuous presence for a noncitizen to be
eligible for cancellation of removal. Critics have argued that the
quickness with which BIA issued its precedent decision should not
be left unnoticed.
The government’s concerns about noncitizen’s violating
U.S. immigration laws are legitimate. The U.S. government has a
responsibility to keep its borders safe and secure, but the
government must follow the rule of law. As the government seeks
to exercise its powers, it should strive to follow the due process
that the law demands. Though the Executive branch of government
oversees the implementation of immigration laws, the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions on immigration laws are binding on
administrative courts and agencies like the BIA. Therefore, the
88
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concept of separation of powers should be adhered to in the
Immigration Law realm. At the beginning of this review, it was
uncertain what authority was precedent as far as the question of the
stop-time rule and its application for the purposes of cancellation
of removal, but the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pereira established
that any NTA that does not list the time, place and date cannot
serve as an NTA that would stop time and give the government the
power to initiate removal proceedings against a non-citizen. Critics
argue that Matter of Bermudez-Costa would not be the last word
on the Pereira ruling. Sooner or later, the Supreme Court will have
to resolve the question of jurisdiction in light of a defective NTA.
The Immigration courts are heavily backlogged. It serves
no purpose for the BIA or any other administrative agency to
continuously contribute to this backlog by serving defective NTAs
to the respondents with the aim of correcting them later with a
subsequent notice of hearing. If the Immigration courts are not
ready to adjudicate removal proceedings the DHS should not be
sending NTAs. The New York Times reports there are about
800,000 backlogged cases of asylum, illegal entry and overstayed
visas.89 When the government sends defective NTAs to the wrong
addresses of respondents as it did in Pereira and respondents have
no idea if they have been sent an NTA, it serves no purpose for the
immigration courts. The government fears that some respondents
that may purposely give the government the wrong address so it
can accrue more time for the purposes of cancellation of removal.
However, those situations are distinguishable from situations
where the DHS may have the correct address but still sends a
defective NTA. Forestalling due process rights of non-citizens only
contributes more to an already heavily backlogged system.
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Noncitizens need the full protections that the law affords
them. Considering that removal in absentia is a grave consequence
that the non-citizen respondent bears for not appearing at a
removal proceeding, it is a great injustice if courts remain
reflexively deferential to the administrative agencies. Like the
Supreme Court said in Pereira, when the government insists that
the following the due process as required by law for NTAs is a
difficult burden to meet it makes the government appear that “is
utterly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on a
notice to appear and will instead engage in ‘arbitrary’ behavior.”90
Arbitrary behavior on the part of the government is when an NTA
lists the date and time of a removal proceeding as “to be set.” This
behavior should not be allowed in the advent of technological
advances. The government; DHS, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol, and the Department of
Justice bear a burden to implement ways it can efficiently run its
immigration courts. The government should be capable of sending
NTAs with the precise place, date, and time just like how the
criminal justice court serves defendants notices for their court date.
On the issue of immigrant rights and due process
protections, it is apparent that noncitizens who are without status
do not have much protections under due process unlike citizens of
the U.S. Given that a lot of noncitizens in removal proceedings
appear in in immigration courts pro se, it is huge detriment if due
process of the law under the immigration and Nationality Act is
undermined.91 According to a New York Times article, appeals of
removal proceedings takes years and months because there is a
significant backlog of cases 92
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There are systems put in place to help with the immigration
system. Noncitizens in the U.S have due process rights. It is
important that the people’s trust and reliance in those systems to
work is not wavered. Uniform laws in immigration law is
important in ensuring a fair day in court for non-citizens.
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